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Abstract
When President Obama took office in 2009, the Treasury focused on restarting bank lending
and repairing the ability of the banking system as a whole to perform the role of credit
intermediation. In order to do so, the Treasury needed to raise public confidence that banks
had sufficient buffers to withstand even a very adverse economic scenario, especially given
heightened uncertainty surrounding the outlook of the U.S. economy and potential losses in
the banking system. The Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP)—the so-called
“stress tests”—sought to rigorously measure the resilience of the largest bank holding
companies. Those found to have insufficient buffers were able to raise funds from the private
sector, and if unable to do so, the Capital Assistance Program (CAP) would capitalize the firm
with public capital.
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1. Introduction
In February 2009, the Treasury announced the Capital Assistance Program (CAP) in
conjunction with the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP). Their purpose was
“to restore confidence throughout the financial system that the nation’s largest banking
institutions have a sufficient capital cushion against larger than expected future losses,
should they occur due to a more severe economic environment, and to support lending to
creditworthy borrowers.” The Treasury was concerned about the lack of near-term private
capital inflows large enough to break the dynamic between the perceived shortage of capital
in the system and the loss of confidence that shortage engenders in the health of individual
institutions in the strained economic environment (Treasury White Paper).
To restore confidence, the SCAP employed a stress test and publicly released the results and
methodology of the tests. Firms that required additional capital to meet their SCAP buffer
were given six months to raise private capital, and the firms unable to do so would then rely
upon public capital sourced from TARP funds via the CAP. Smaller firms not included in the
SCAP were eligible to apply for Treasury funds through the CAP.
The remainder of the case is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the SCAP’s design and
results, and Section 3 describes the CAP’s design and results.
Questions
1. What was the justification for using the Tier 1 Common capital ratio in lieu of the
tangible common equity ratio?
2. What was the rationale of having the mandatory participation in the SCAP set at an
asset size of $100 billion or over? What effect did the policymakers and regulators
predict this set threshold would have on the ongoing and future risk management of
financial institutions?
3. How effective was the SCAP in restoring confidence in the supported institutions, the
other non-supported institutions, and the overall financial market? Would the SCAP
be effective in preventing and managing future crises in not only selected large and
complex financial institutions, but also the financial markets more broadly?
4. Is the fact that CAP went un-utilized a sign of an effective government effort to restore
confidence in the market or a reluctance on the part of the banks to take on the
government intervention in fear of high costs or stigma?
5. How did supervisors decide upon capital adequacy ratios of a Tier 1 capital ratio of
six percent and a Tier 1 Common capital ratio of four percent?
6. What was the advantage to measuring the stress rather than in-the-moment capital
in the SCAP?
7. Why was the window for firms to raise private capital or else turn to the CAP six
months?
8. Discuss alternative ways the regulators could have provided transparency in their
tests.
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9. How did regulators decide to allow firms with Treasury capital from the CAP to
convert the Treasury’s preferred shares to common equity at a 10% discount to the
firm’s stock price?
10. To what extent did the firms challenge the SCAP’s initial findings, and did this have
any impact on the finalized, published stress test results?
11. What designs of a capital injection program help strike the right balance between
sufficiently protecting the taxpayer’s interests and effectively restoring lending
activity in the market?

2. Supervisory Capital Assistance Program (SCAP)
U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) with assets in excess of $100 billion5 on a consolidated
basis were required to participate in the coordinated “stress test” known as the SCAP, and
had access to the CAP immediately as a means to build any necessary additional buffer
although they could raise private capital over the following six months. The Treasury worked
with federal banking regulators to develop this stress test to determine the health of the
relevant financial institutions. As a result, the 19 largest BHCs, which together held twothirds of assets and more than one-half of the loans in the U.S. banking system, participated
in the SCAP on a mandatory basis (OFS 2010).
While the SCAP was similar to stress tests that firms undertook as part of their ongoing risk
management, the objective of this program was “to conduct a comprehensive and consistent
assessment simultaneously” across the largest BHCs using a common set of macroeconomic
scenarios and a common forward-looking conceptual framework. This framework allowed
supervisors to apply a consistent and systematic approach across firms to evaluate projected
losses and resource estimates submitted by the firms and to conduct cross-firm analysis on
the aggregate. The SCAP was considerably more comprehensive than stress tests that focus
on individual business lines because it simultaneously incorporated all major assets and
revenue sources for each firm (FRS April 2009).
The SCAP was an important complement to the Treasury’s support of the banking system.
The Federal Reserve System (Fed) believed that the SCAP would help ensure the strength of
the banking sector and revive markets’ confidence in the banks. It believed that the program
would help protect the taxpayers’ investments in U.S. financial institutions (FBS May 2010).
It also believed the high level of transparency would help rebuild confidence in the banking
system. In its results, the Fed noted, “The decision to depart from the standard practice of
keeping examination information confidential stemmed from the belief that greater clarity
around the SCAP process and findings will make the exercise more effective at reducing
uncertainty and restoring confidence in our financial institutions” (Federal Reserve May 7,
2009). Some two weeks later, Treasury Secretary Geithner’s statement before the Senate
Banking Committee on May 20, 2009, stated the review conducted under the SCAP was
indeed “helping to increase confidence in the financial system” (Geithner 2009).

__________________________________________________________________
As measured according to the firms’ assets report for 2008Q4 in the Federal Reserve’s Consolidated
Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies (FR Y-9C).
5
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Design of SCAP
Macroeconomic Conditions
The Fed provided indicative loss rates under two different macroeconomic environments—
“baseline” and “more adverse”—to guide BHCs' estimates. The Fed supervisors chose
particularly severe conditions in the “more adverse” scenario, with the estimated
commercial bank two-year loan loss rate at 9.1%; a rate higher than any observed from 1920
to 2008. The scenario also included estimates of unemployment at the highest level since the
1930s. Figure 1 details the two scenarios. Firms used these two scenarios to conduct their
own estimates, and then the Fed staff analyzed each firm’s estimates independently (FRS
May 2009).
Test Design
The SCAP involved the projection of losses on loans, assets held in investment portfolios, and
trading-related exposures as well as the firm’s capacity to absorb losses that all combined to
determine a sufficient capital level to support lending under a worse-than-expected
macroeconomic scenario. Given the heightened uncertainty about the economic outlook and
losses in the banking system and the possibility for adverse economic outcomes to be
magnified through the banking system, supervisors believed it “prudent for large BHCs to
hold substantial capital to absorb losses” should the economic downturn be longer and
deeper than anticipated (FRS April 2009). In this sense, the tests represented a set of “whatif” scenarios and were not a set of estimates or projections (FRS May 2009, page 14).
Fed staff examined both the level of capital in each BHC as well as the composition of the
capital held by evaluating the Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio, which is the ratio of Tier 1
capital to risk-weighted assets. The Fed also evaluated common equity’s share of Tier 1
capital. Tier 1 capital was required to be at least half of qualifying total capital (12 CFR part
225, Appendix A, Section II.A.1). In practice, these measures are referred to as the Tier 1
Common capital ratio and the Tier 1 capital ratio where the former excludes preferred shares
and non-controlling interests and the latter includes them. Regulators focused on Tier 1
Common specifically as it is the first to absorb losses and so acts as a permanent cushion that
can adjust to changing circumstances by varying dividends and their timing (12 CFR part
225, Appendix A).
In designing and implementing the tests, the Fed sought to answer two questions to
determine the resources required to withstand a more adverse macroeconomic
environment (emphasis added):
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Figure 1: SCAP Economic Scenarios
2009

2010

-2.0

2.1

Consensus Forecasts

-2.1

2.0

Blue Chip

-1.9

2.1

Survey of Professional
Forecasters
-2.0

2.2

Real GDP1
Average Baseline2

Alternative More Adverse

-3.3

0.5

8.4

8.8

Consensus Forecasts

8.4

9.0

Blue Chip

8.3

8.7

Survey of Professional
Forecasters
8.4

8.8

Civilian Unemployment
Rate3
Average Baseline

Alternative More Adverse

8.9

10.3

Baseline

-14

-4

Alternative More Adverse

-22

-7

House Prices4

1 Percent change in annual average.
2 Baseline forecasts for real GDP and

the unemployment rate equal the average projections
released by Conesus Forecasts, Blue Chip, and Survey of Professional Forecasters in February
2009.
3 Annual average.
4 Case-Shiller 10-City Composite, percent change, Q4/Q4.
Source: Federal Reserve (May 7, 2009).
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1.

If the economy follows the “more adverse” scenario, how much additional Tier 1
capital6 would an institution need today to be able to have a Tier 1 risk-based
ratio in excess of six percent at year-end 2010?

2.

If the economy follows the “more adverse” scenario, how much additional Tier 1
Common capital7 would an institution need to have today to have a Tier 1
Common capital risk-based ratio in excess of four percent at year-end 2010?

Involved BHCs initially estimated their potential losses on loans, securities, trading
positions, their pre-provision net revenue, and their resources available from the allowance
for loan and lease losses over the two-year horizon, beginning with end of year 2008
financial statement data. Firms estimated loan losses due to failure to pay obligations instead
of marking-to-market to find estimated discounts. Further, firms estimated losses stemming
from trading-related market and counterparty credit losses.
Particular focus centered on losses in available-for-sale (AFS) and held-to-maturity (HTM)
portfolios, as well as counterparty credit risk. Losses in these items would ultimately
represent the largest share of total losses. Supervisors analyzed whether securitized assets
would become impaired over their lifetime—if this were the case, and if credit support was
insufficient to cover expected losses, the security was written down to fair value.
In its analysis, the Fed considered whether a firm intended to sell a security or “whether it is
more-likely-than-not that firms will be required to sell the security before recovery of its
cost basis.” Both scenarios triggered an “other than temporary impairment” charge.
Regulators felt it best practice, following the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s
guidance, to account for the eventuality that firms might not be able to hold a security to
recovery under more stressful conditions. For securities determined to be other than
temporarily impaired, the loss was the difference between the investment's amortized cost
basis and fair value (FRS May 2009, page 7-8).
Market participants also questioned whether Q1 2009 results would be included in the
estimates. After a period, regulators decided to include these revenues. In the subsequently
published information for each institution, a line item addressed this explicitly as in footnote
3 in Figure 2 noting, “[c]apital actions include completed or contracted transactions since Q4
2008.”
The design also assumed that the institutions would continue to operate under the
regulatory framework existing as of December 31, 2008, and under any significant changes
in the framework that would take place the next two years. The stress test included an
assessment of capital at the end of 2010 capturing expected losses in 2011, as BHCs
__________________________________________________________________
Tier 1 capital is “the sum of core capital elements less any amount of goodwill, other intangible assets,
interest-only strips receivables, deferred tax assets, nonfinancial equity investments, and other items” (12
CFR part 225, Appendix A).
6

Tier 1 Common capital means “tier 1 capital less the non-common elements of tier 1 capital, including
perpetual preferred stock and related surplus, minority interest in subsidiaries, trust preferred securities,
and mandatory convertible preferred securities” (12 CFR §225.8). It reflects the fact that common equity is
the first element of the capital structure to absorb losses, offering protection to more senior parts of the
capital structure and lowering the risk of insolvency. All else equal, more Tier 1 Common capital gives a BHC
greater permanent loss absorption capacity and a greater ability to conserve resources under stress by
changing the amount and timing of dividends and other distributions ( FRS May 2009).
7
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participating in the SCAP booked the majority of their assets on an accrual basis (FRS April
2009).
Any BHC needing to supplement its capital buffer was required to develop a detailed capital
plan for approval by its primary supervisor, after consultation with the FDIC and the
Treasury. BHCs were also encouraged to design capital plans that, wherever possible,
actively sought to raise new capital from private sources (FRS May 2009).
A key feature of the SCAP was the level of transparency involved. Under the SCAP,
supervisors published the design of the tests and their results at a detailed level, much of
which was usually confidential and not released publicly. The Treasury’s Office of Financial
Stability (OFS) described this transparency as a novel step taken due to the unprecedented
need to restore confidence (OFS 2010). The Fed also noted that this was an unprecedented
exercise, and with the extraordinary economic and financial conditions that precipitated the
program, the unprecedented nature of the program led the supervisors to take an unusual
step of publicly reporting the findings of this supervisory exercise (FRS May 2009). Figure 2
provides a sample of the information published at the firm-specific level.
Results of SCAP
The SCAP found a more adverse economic scenario would result in losses of some $600
billion among the 19 firms involved through 2010, implying total losses of $950 billion from
mid-2007 to the end of 2010. The same firms held some $835 billion in Tier 1 capital in Q4
2008 and all exceeded their minimum regulatory capital standards.
This suggested the firms had enough capacity to handle the $600 billion in losses through
2010: the firms would also generate revenues through the same period that could be used to
offset losses, although firms would also need to build reserves against credit problems
beyond 2010 for the SCAP. Combining these factors, supervisors found the firms needed to
add $75 billion more in capital buffers to meet the SCAP target buffer by the end of 2010
after accounting for Q1 2009 revenues under the “more adverse” scenario.
Nine of the 19 firms involved were sufficiently capitalized for the four percent Tier 1
Common capital and six percent Tier 1 capital targets. Moreover, almost all the firms had
enough Tier 1 capital to withstand the more adverse scenario. However, ten of the firms (i.e.
those requiring the $75 billion more capital) had more capital in forms other than common
equity. Figure 3 shows the results by firm.
Assessment of SCAP
Initial reactions to the stress tests were “generally positive,” although some market
commentators questioned the use of the Tier 1 Common capital ratio instead of the tangible
common equity (TCE) ratio, which many had originally assumed would be the supervisors'
benchmark. Where the Tier 1 Common capital ratio is the capital of common shareholders
as a percent of risk-weighted assets, the TCE ratio is equity less intangible assets, goodwill,
and preferred stock equity as a percent of tangible assets, which are the company’s total
assets less goodwill and intangibles (Wall Street Journal, May 9 2009).
OFS reported that since the release of the results of the SCAP, the institutions subject to the
stress test altogether increased their requisite capital by over $150 billion as of September
2010. Additionally, OFS emphasized that after the SCAP participating BHCs raised this
additional capital, more than 80 other banks raised sufficient capital to repay the TARP
investments made by the Treasury (although not through the CAP) (OFS 2010).
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Figure 2: Example of Published SCAP Results
Supervisory Capital Assessment Program
Estimates for Bank of America Corporation for the More Adverse Economic Scenario
The estimates below represent a hypothetical “what-if” scenario that involves an economic
outcome that is more adverse than expected. These estimates are not forecasts of expected
losses or revenues.

Bank of America
Corporation
$
Billions As % of RWA
173.2
10.6%
74.5
4.6%
1,633.8

At December 31, 2008
Tier 1 Capital
Tier 1 Common Capital
Risk-Weighted Assets

Estimated for 2009 and 2010 for the More Adverse
Scenario
Total Estimated Losses (Before purchase accounting
adjustment)
First Lien Mortgage
Second/Junior Lien Mortgage
Commercial and Industrial Loans
Commercial Real Estate Loans
Credit Card Loans
Securities (AFS and HTM)
Trading & Counterparty
Other (1)
Memo: Purchase Accounting Adjustments
Resources Other Than Capital to Absorb Losses (2)

More Adverse Scenario
$
Billions As % of Loans
136.6
22.1
21.4
15.7
9.4
19.1
8.5
24.1
16.4
13.3
74.5

6.8%
13.5%
7.0%
9.1%
23.5%
-na-na-na-

SCAP Buffer Added for More Adverse Scenario
(SCAP buffer is defined as additional Tier 1 Common/contingent
Common)
Indicated SCAP Buffer as of December 31, 2008
46.5
Less: Capital Actions and Effects of Q1 2009 Results (3)
10.9
Other Capital Actions (4)
1.8
SCAP Buffer
33.9
(1) Includes other consumer and non-consumer loans and miscellaneous commitments and
obligations.
(2) Resources to absorb losses include pre-provision net revenue less the change in the
allowance for loan and lease loans.
(3) Capital actions include completed or contracted transactions since Q4 2008.
(4) Capital benefit from risk-weighted assets impact of eligible asset guarantee.
Note: Numbers may not sum due to rounding.
Source: Federal Reserve (May 7, 2009).
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On the other hand, another government report highlighted the moral hazard concerns
relating to the stress test under the SCAP. It pointed out that some saw the focus of SCAP on
BHCs with more than $100 billion in asset size as a formal demarcation of too-big-to-fail. The
report also expressed that this focus of the SCAP created an impression that the federal
government would protect the 19 BHCs at least for the duration of the financial crisis due to
their size (FCIC 2010).
Figure 3: SCAP Results
Firm

Additional Capital
Required

Bank of America

$33.9 billion

Wells Fargo

$13.7 billion

GMAC

$11.5 billion

Citigroup

$5.5 billion

Regions Financial Corp.

$2.5 billion

SunTrust Banks

$2.2 billion

Morgan Stanley

$1.8 billion

KeyCorp

$1.8 billion

Fifth Third Bank

$1.1 billion

PNC

$0.6 billion

American Express

Adequate

Bank of New York Mellon

Adequate

BB&T

Adequate

Capital One

Adequate

Goldman Sachs

Adequate

JP Morgan Chase

Adequate

MetLife

Adequate

State Street

Adequate

U.S. Bancorp

Adequate

Source: Federal Reserve (May 7, 2009).
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This concern was somewhat seen in rating agencies’ practice of upgrading the largest banks
based on their access to extensive support from the federal government in 2009. For
example, Moody’s upgraded ratings for deposits and senior debt issued by the six largest U.S.
banks, based on its expectation of “a very high probability of systemic support” for such
banks from the U.S. government (FCIC 2010). Moreover, the Wall Street Journal reported
that Standard & Poor’s gave a rating upgrade to Citigroup; the agency added that it would
have been rated four notches lower with no government assistance. On the other hand,
Standard & Poor’s downgraded a Citibank subsidiary, Citibank Korea Inc., in its stand-alone
rating because it felt that there was “uncertainty” about whether the U.S. government wanted
Citigroup providing additional support to noncore oversea affiliates (Eavis 2009).

3. Capital Assistance Program (CAP)
If the SCAP test indicated a bank needed more capital, the Treasury would provide the
additional capital buffer through the CAP in the form of convertible preferred securities
should the bank be unable to raise enough capital through private sources. These convertible
preferred holdings would be convertible to common equity “if needed to retain the
confidence of investors or to meet supervisory expectations regarding the amount and
composition of capital” (Treasury White Paper). The Treasury offered the CAP to all banks
and qualifying financial institutions, unlike the SCAP discussed above which was limited to
the 19 largest BHCs. BHCs had six months to raise additional capital, but could apply to the
CAP immediately after the publication of the SCAP results and delay actual funding for the
six months while the firms raised as much private capital as possible.
Qualifying financial institutions (QFIs) were eligible to apply to the CAP. QFIs included BHCs,
financial holding companies, insured depository institutions, and savings and loan holding
companies, that were organized and operating in the United States and deemed viable by the
appropriate federal banking agency. Financial institutions controlled by foreign entities
were ineligible (Treasury February 25, 2009).
Design of CAP
Terms and conditions of the CAP included the following:
•

Capital provided under the CAP were preferred security that was convertible into
common equity and carried a 9% dividend yield;

•

After seven years, the security would automatically convert into common equity if not
redeemed or converted before that date;

•

If economic conditions proved worse than expected firms could convert, with
approval from their regulator, Treasury capital into common equity at a conversion
price set at a 10% discount from the firm’s stock price as of February 9, 2009;

•

The instrument was designed to give banks the incentive to replace the governmentprovided capital with private capital as quickly as possible;

•

With supervisory approval, banks were able to request capital under the CAP in
addition to their existing Capital Purchase Program (CPP) preferred shares, and were
allowed to apply to exchange the existing CPP or Targeted Investment Program
preferred shares for the new CAP preferred security;
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•

As was the case with other capital injection programs discussed above, participants
of the CAP were subject to the executive compensation requirements in line with the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) and subject to restrictions on
paying quarterly common stock dividends, repurchasing shares, and pursuing cash
acquisitions;

•

As part of the application process, banks were required to submit a plan for how they
intend to use the CAP capital to preserve and strengthen their lending capacity, and
the Treasury was to make this plan public when the bank received the capital under
the CAP; and

•

Taxpayers were able to monitor the performance of banks receiving capital under the
CAP by accessing online monthly reports submitted by the banks to the Treasury
showing the status of their lending.
(Term Sheet for CAP).

Results of CAP
After the Fed released the results of the SCAP, ten firms collectively needed to add $75 billion
to reach their SCAP capital buffer targets (FRS May 2009). Nine of those banks were able to
fulfill their additional capital needs privately. Only one firm, Ally Financial (formerly GMAC),
required public capital to meet its SCAP requirements. However, the firm received funding
through the Automotive Industry Financing Program, and not the CAP (OFS 2010).
Ultimately, the Treasury did not receive any applications for the CAP, and the program closed
on November 9, 2009. OFS viewed this as an indicator of the effectiveness of the SCAP, as
well as other government efforts in responding to the financial crisis. (OFS 2010).
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